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Abstract 
 
Public procurement used as an innovation policy instrument has attracted attention the last 
decade. It has been argued that public procurement can be used to stimulate innovation from 
the demand-side. This paper problematizes ‘demand’ understood as a problem defined by a 
public procurer given to potential suppliers to solve. By drawing on a cross-case analysis of 
two similar projects the paper attempts to explicate an understanding of the role of public 
procurement of innovation not primarily as a ‘demand-side innovation instrument’, as such 
thinking might run the risk of ignoring important underlying mechanisms critical for success. 
Instead the paper views public procurement of innovation as an instrument of endogenous- 
exogenous knowledge conversion. 
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Introduction 
 
Apart from a sourcing mechanism evoked to directly secure the delivery of public services 
public procurement may be used to achieve certain social outcomes (McRudden, 2004). 
Secondary effects of public procurement may be e.g. market creation (Caldwell et al, 2005); 
the promotion of sustainable technologies (Walker et al, 2012); decreasing climate impacts 
(Nissinen et al., 2012); or facilitating adoption of innovative technologies emerging elsewhere 
(Phillips et al, 2007). This paper attempts to contribute with knowledge regarding the role of 
public procurement as a means to stimulate innovation (Edler and Georghiou, 2007; Rolfstam, 
2009; Uyarra and Flanagan, 2010), a topic that has attracted attention from policy makers 
(e.g. European Commission, 2010; OECD, 2011). The underlying idea is that public demand 
for innovative goods and services can stimulate firms’ commitment to innovation and thereby 
gain competitive advantages in a global economy. It appears however as the policy 
development aiming at promoting public procurement as a demand-side innovation policy 
instrument has not materialized into concrete action to the extent envisaged by policy makers. 
The official view is still that “Europe has an enormous and overlooked opportunity to spur 
innovation using procurement” (European Commission, 2011, p. 16, italics added). Also 
practitioners note that “public procurement of innovation is hardly ever used in a strategic 
way” (van Putten, 2012).  
 
The perceived underutilisation has rendered debates concerning how to fully exploit the 
potential in public procurement of innovation. Arguments have been brought forward 
concerning claimed innovation-inhibiting effects in the legislative framework (for the EU, the 
EC Directives on Public Procurement) (Edquist et al., 2000; an assumption falsified in 
empirical research (Rolfstam, 2007; 2012a). The issue of risk associated with innovation has 
also been brought up (Aho et al 2006; Tsipouri et al. 2010). Scholars have also underscored 
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the need for allocation of different aspects of management skills for successful public 
procurement of innovation (Rolfstam, 2007; Uyarra and Flanagan 2010; Yeow and Edler, 
2012). A common nominator for these debates is that problems and solutions are sought after 
by scrutinizing public actors only. With the understanding of public procurement of 
innovation as a process that includes one or more public agencies that works together with 
one or more suppliers and/or other organisations, it is noteworthy that very little attention has 
been given to potentially important factors residing outside the public side of the story, for 
instance the role of suppliers and the institutional context in which a particular public 
procurement of innovation-project takes place. The current paper attempts to help filling this 
void by drawing on institutional theory and theories on knowledge conversion. 
 
Institutional theory and knowledge conversion 
 
With the increasing interest for this topic have emerged different notions, innovation 
procurement, public technology procurement, innovative procurement, etc., all with slightly 
varying definitions. The generic notion applied here is public procurement of innovation 
understood as “purchasing activities carried out by public agencies that lead to innovation” 
(Rolfstam, 2012b, p. 1). The advantage with this definition is that it takes into account all 
kinds of activities that may take place as pre-cursors or in the aftermath of a specific 
procurement process i.e. activities in the commissioning cycle and the procurement cycle 
(Murray, 2009), including also activities leading to awareness of possibilities and threats in 
the external world. It opens up for an understanding of public procurement of innovation as a 
continuous process within a public agency. This is somewhat different from definitions that 
might have been more widely diffused. One example is the old definition of technology 
procurement understood to occur “when a public agency acts to purchase, or place an order 
for, a product – service, good, or system – that does not yet exist, but which could (probably) 
be developed within a reasonable period of time, based on additional or new innovative work 
by the organisation(s) undertaking to produce, supply, and sell the product being purchased” 
(Edquist and Hommen, 2000, p. 5). Even if public demand can manifest also as long-term 
signalling, labelling or regulation (Gregersen, 1992; Geroski, 1990; Rothwell, 1984) this 
definition has helped to reduce public procurement of innovation to mainly concern “procurer 
competence” and specification. Public procurement of innovation becomes in this light a 
project-level command-tool, where potential suppliers are asked to solve a certain problem 
where success is mainly determined by management and organisation-specific decisions, a 
view that “largely ignores the contributions of institutional approaches (Coriat and Weinstein, 
2002, p. 274). The current paper attempts to variegate what these authors (ibid) consider an 
overemphasis on organisation-specific decisions by adding a holistic analytic layer drawing 
on institutional theory. This is an endeavour essentially set out to delimit the role of 
‘management’. The assertion promoted is that although e.g. procurer competence and 
specifications are examples of important demand-side factors for success in public 
procurement of innovation, the readiness of potential suppliers and the institutional context in 
which a procurement project occurs are as important factors for successful outcomes of public 
procurement of innovation. 
  
Rolfstam (2012) develops a theoretical framework for understanding public procurement of 
innovation that draws on institutional theory. This framework treats innovation as a special 
case of human collaboration and as such governed, supported, affected and/ or regulated by 
institutions understood as at least effectually collectively agreed on ex ante structures. The 
framework considers institutions as prevailing on different levels which enables the 
distinction between exogenous and endogenous institutions (Jacoby, 1990). Exogenous 
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institutions are many times formal and based on and enforced by authority. Endogenous 
institutions are more often informal rules that individual agents decide to give themselves 
which evolve within an institutional set-up. Institutions can also be considered as rationalities 
(Van de Donk and Snellen,  1989, or selection mechanisms determining learning for a 
particular institutional context (Vanberg, 1997; Argyris, 1994) and the creation of 
organisation and/or context-specific routines (Nelson and Winter, 1982). In other words, for 
an economic entity working under scarce resources its rationality will determine if it develops 
specialised skills useful for, let’s say fire-fighting instead of investment in bio-tech start-up 
firms. These mechanisms evolve also on institutional levels such as regions or nations. 
Regions for example, are “often defined in terms of shared normative interests (culture areas), 
economic specificity (mono-industrial economies) and administrative homogeneity 
(governance areas)” (Cooke, 1998, p. 15). Sometimes this mechanism can be seen as 
developed based on natural assets in a given region, for instance a natural harbour that leads 
to development of shipping, shipbuilding, and other related maritime industries. The generic 
point to make is that innovation is not a rational process that builds on free knowledge 
available for anyone to apply. Rather, innovation occurs based on institutionalised path-
dependent rationalities as prevailing in specific contexts that match with each other. 
 
Similarly, although with a completely different starting point, argues Nonaka (1994, p. 14), 
that “innovation”…”cannot be explained sufficiently in terms of information processing or 
problem solving. Rather, innovation can be understood as a process in which the organization 
creates and defines problems and then actively develops new knowledge to solve them”. 
Nonaka describes knowledge creation as interactive processes that take place in two 
dimensions, the ontological dimension and the epistemological. The ontological dimension 
refers to the interaction between individuals, groups, organisations and interorganisational 
interaction. The epistemological dimension refers to the interaction between tacit knowledge 
and explicit knowledge. Organisational knowledge leading to innovation is created from an 
initial idea gradually allowed to transform between tacit and explicit modes and evolve 
through-out and across organisations. The knowledge creation process is however not free, 
but is exposed to judgements prevailing within the organisation. Apart from rational business 
considerations the “truth-fullness” of new knowledge is determined by “opinions about such 
things as the extent to which the knowledge created is consistent with the organization's 
vision and perceptions relating to adventure, romanticism, and aesthetics” (Nonaka, 1994, p. 
26), i.e. in institutional terms, the endogenous institutional set-up of a particular organisation 
and/ or context. 
 
Let us then assume a procurement process as formal and exogenous, in relation to the supply 
side and the context in which it occurs. Applying the Nonaka model in combination with the 
institutional framework outlined above, paves the way for the understanding of success in 
public procurement of innovation as depending on an institutional match between the 
exogenous demand defined, and the endogenous institutions prevailing among suppliers and 
other stakeholders. A tender call must somehow align with endogenous “opinions about 
things” in order to become successful. In that light becomes public procurement of innovation 
a way of facilitating endogenous knowledge conversion (fig 1).  
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Fig. 1. Public procurement of innovation as facilitation of endogenous knowledge conversion. 
 
This perspective provides an alternative understanding of the formal public procurement 
processes. Rather than being an act of ‘demand as in command” or a matter of problem 
solving, it becomes instead an interface where alignment with different institutional levels and 
rationalities becomes a central issue. This assertion and its implications are investigated in a 
cross-case analysis of two public procurement of innovation projects, as described below. 
 
Method 
 
The paper draws on two cases of public procurement set out to render innovation. Evidence 
drawn on was gathered through reviews of documentation, archival records, face-to-face 
interviews, telephone interviews and e-mail communication with stakeholders (Yin, 1994). 
Two relatively similar cases with diverging outcomes render obviously interesting 
opportunities for comparison. By comparing a researcher may be able to reject competing 
explanatory variables (Ragin, 1987, p. 38). For a single-case analysis one might draw 
conclusions based on identified phenomena caused by certain stimuli. A cross-case analysis 
might strengthen the initial conclusion if the same phenomenon occurs caused by the same 
stimuli also in the other case. On the other hand - if a certain phenomenon is caused by the 
presence of a certain stimuli, this does not imply a causal dependence if the same 
phenomenon occurs in another context without the stimuli being present. That is at least the 
general advantage with comparing two cases with each other.  
 
Two cases of public procurement of innovation 
 
Discussed here are one case that evolved in Bracknell Forrest, UK, “the Woodchip case” and 
a case that evolved in Sweden, ”the Bio-fuel case”. The Wood-chip case concerned the 
English town Bracknell Forrest that initiated a project with the intention to build a sustainable 
power plant running on wood-chip (Rolfstam, 2012a). This was a sub-project in a rather 
substantive re-generation of the town-centre threatened by economic decline. The wood-chip-
fuelled power plant was intended to deliver sustainable energy to the renewed part of the town 
centre. The basic reason why the project failed was that the project did not manage to 
negotiate the differences between rationalities and organisation-specific institutional set-ups 
among the stakeholders. The project would have led to different types of innovation, had it 
eventually been finalized. However, as things developed the procurers eventually came to a 
stage where there were no suppliers interested in submitting a bid and the procurers had to 
terminate the project without rewarding the contract.  
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The Bio-fuel case concerned the public procurement project that led to the development and 
finalization of what at the time was a state of the art facility in Sweden, the Biogas and 
Upgrading Plant in the Swedish town Västerås (Rolfstam, 2010). This case evolved in the 
context of the Agropti-project funded by the European Commission, which was a 
demonstration project for these kinds of technologies. The outcome of the project, the energy 
system came in operation in 2005 as the result of a process beginning some fifteen years 
earlier when local farmers began to consider abandoning increasingly less profitable food 
production and instead turn into production of green energy. The Biogas and Upgrading Plant 
was built to produce bio energy from organic waste generated by citizens in the region, ley 
crop grown by local farmers and grease trap removal sludge from restaurants and institutional 
kitchens in the area. The bio fuel that came out of the process would be used in buses in the 
region, waste collection vehicles and cars. Biogas that was not upgraded to fuel quality was 
used for production of electricity and heat. The residuals remaining in this process were used 
as high quality fertilizers by local farmers.  
 
A comparison of the two cases reveals at least the following. Both projects intended to 
achieve some kind of sustainable energy solution. Both projects also envisaged the creation of 
local supply-markets. In the Bio-fuel case, a market for ley-crop was initiated. In the Wood-
chip case, the energy production would have relied on local supply of energy wood. The level 
of innovation the two projects had in mind appears also to be similar. In both cases the 
envisaged systems would have manifested state-of-the-art technology in the respective 
countries. Some elements appear in both cases, but were implemented in different ways, as 
discussed in the following sections. 
 
Multiple rationalities in public procurement of innovation 
 
Both projects consisted of an array of different organisations that each had a stake in the 
process. In the Bio-fuel case several public agencies and NGO’s were involved: VAFAB 
miljö, a public environment (waste handling) company in turned owned jointly by the 
municipalities in Västmanlands County and two other municipalities; Mälarenergi AB, a 
public utility owned by Västerås municipality; Lantbrukarnas Ekonomi AB a company owned 
by The Federation of Swedish Farmers (LRF) and; Odlargruppen, an association gathering of 
local farmers who later would become the supplier of ley crop and buyer of fertilisers. In the 
Wood-chip case, stakeholders in the project were, apart from the Bracknell Forest Borough 
Council also the political leadership of the town; the Bracknell Forest Regeneration 
Partnership (BRP), a joint venture consisting of the major local land-owners; the Thames 
Valley Energy (TV Energy), an organisation devoted to the promotion of green energy; two 
EU funded energy development projects aiming at promoting and diffuse new knowledge on 
green technologies; and potential suppliers. 
 
Organising Rationality Representation 
 
In the Bio-fuel case, stakeholders that would become future users of the final system were 
included already from the beginning while the procurement side in the Wood-chip case 
consisted essentially of all rationalities apart from future users. In the Bio-fuel case, the future 
operator of the facility, Växtkraft AB carried out the procurement project. Indirectly included 
as co-owners of Växtkraft AB, were also stakeholders that would be a part of the system once 
in operation. One example are the farmer members of Odlargruppen, interested in finding a 
market that would enable a shift from growing food to instead growing crops that could be 
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used for energy production. The Wood-chip case, on the other hand, evolved as a catalytic - 
and in a way also a distributed procurement process where the role of the public procurers at 
Bracknell Forrest was to facilitate the process, not to operate the power plant. Instead, the 
builder and future operator was to be allocated through the procurement process. In the 
Wood-chip case the procurer-side included rationalities that where relevant for promotion of 
secondary rationalities that would not have a direct operative interest in the power plant once 
it was built. TV Energy and the BRP for instance, represented primarily other rationalities; in 
the case of the TV Energy the promotion of sustainable technology in general and in the case 
of BRP, the ambition to build a new town centre. 
 
The observation that the rationalities of the future operations was included on the procurer-
side in the Bio-fuel case but excluded in the Wood-chip case is noteworthy. In the Bio-fuel 
case, any critical requirement from the future operator could be integrated into the project 
already from the beginning. As will be discussed further below, several other issues related to 
the operations of the future power plant were also dealt with before the actual tender call was 
published. One example of such foresight was the securing of commitments by certain target 
groups on which the future operation would rely on. In the Wood-chip case, such operator 
access would have been established only after identification of the supplier/ operator, i.e. after 
the contract had been awarded. This means that the whole pre-procurement phase where the 
project was defined lacked a stakeholder that would advocate the operator’s rationality.  
 
Interaction for innovation 
 
Both the cases included interaction with different stakeholders such as public agencies, 
suppliers, and other forms of organisations. The problem as revealed in the two cases is that 
establishing what actors belong to the procurer side and to the supplier side is not a 
completely straightforward task to do – at least not if one assumes the sides to be distinct 
from each other. As we saw in the Bio-fuel case, the farmers as represented by Odlargruppen, 
were part of the procurer-side as members of the Växtkraft board, in the same time as they 
were also a part of the future solution; they were becoming the future suppliers of ley-crop as 
well as customers paying for the fertilizers. In the sense that the whole project emerged as a 
response to the strive towards developing an alternative to conventional farming, one could 
say that the farmers provided demand as well as parts of the supply, if not to the construction, 
so at least to the operation of the innovation to be built. In the Wood-chip case, the starting 
point for the whole project was the perceived need for a completely new town centre in order 
to sustain economic growth. In addition there was also pressure from paradigmatic and 
political rationalities emphasising sustainable energy. The procurers at the local council 
facilitated in that sense a procurement process driven by demand from others.  
 
Interaction with the external environment 
 
Another difference revealed in the comparison between the cases concerns interaction with 
the external environment. This was especially immanent in the Bio-fuel case where procurers 
extended their interaction to include also stakeholders not directly involved in the contract. 
Over the years several different meetings where held with organisation and groups that could 
affect or be affected by the project. The procurers interacted with environmental authorities, 
city planning authorities, The Swedish food industry, the KRAV (environmental labelling) 
organisation, voluntary environmental organisations, public consumer organisations and the 
Swedish Association of Waste Management. The way stakeholders (other than the procurer 
and the suppliers) were utilized was not only in terms of discussions or sharing of 
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information. An array of these external stakeholders played a concrete role in relation to the 
risk management and the decision to actually go ahead with the project. It appears that this 
interaction with external bodies was significant for the success of the project. Without the 
consent of these stakeholders, the project would not have been able to proceed. Long-term 
agreements with local farmers were set-up to assure sufficient supply of ley crop to be used 
by the bio-plant. Long-term agreements with local bus company for buying bio-fuel were set-
up to guarantee a supply marked for the product, bio fuel. Required legal documents, e.g. 
related to environmental laws had to be in place. Before commencing with the project, the 
procurers sustained approving document from food industry verifying that the fertilizers that 
would come out of the system could be used for food production. People who lived near the 
location for the planned system were also consulted.  
 
Also in the Wood-chip case, different organisations were allowed to influence the project. 
There were however some stakeholders that were not included in the Wood-chip case that 
were included in the Bio-fuel case. As the buildings in the new town centre were yet to be 
built there were no tenants available. Any ambition to interact with future tenants in the pre-
procurement phase was therefore impossible. The situation was the same for interaction with 
the supplier and future operator and any stakeholders that the supplier and future operator 
would consider important to include. Such supplier- stakeholder interaction could essentially 
take place only when the operator had won the contract, i.e. when the supplier would know it 
would build the energy centre. The problem was that the commitments ideally coming from 
such interactions would be required to establish the commercial feasibility of the project, 
which was a requirement for being able to place a bid in the first place. Without them, the 
suppliers were not prepared to take the risk. In this sense did the project in its own ‘absolute 
simplicity’ create its own institutional barriers that reduced the possibilities for interaction 
(Heller, 1994). Thus, there is an institutional explanation to why this interaction did not take 
place in the Woodchip case - the institutional set-up of the project did not allow it. 
 
The role of specifications 
 
The way specifications were used varied between the two projects. In the Bio-fuel case, the 
tender call was set-up following the principles of performance-based procurement (PBP) 
(Wade and Björkman, 2004). In practice this meant that the procurers defined how much bio-
gas the intended system should be able to deliver, not specifically how that should be 
achieved, leaving to the supplier to figure out how the function should be implemented. In the 
Wood-chip case the winner of the contract was supposed to build and operate the power plant. 
What was different from the Bio-fuel case was the rather explicit demand for renewable 
technologies which worked to restrict such freedom of action and also therefore to reduce the 
variety among bidders. In retrospect one could argue that formulating a specification that 
would have encouraged innovative solutions while still allowing more conventional solutions 
might have been a better option as this might have allowed bids based on conventional 
technologies to be submitted.  
 
Another aspect of specification concerned the configuration of the bidding side. Here the two 
projects applied two different approaches. In the Bio-fuel case, the finalisation of the 
complete system relied on several different suppliers where each supplied a component of the 
system. In the Wood-chip case smaller firms and firms that could not document technological 
experience on the scale corresponding to the intended system were excluded. The tender call 
in the Wood-chip case was also set-up with a financial requirement. As the future ESCO 
would have to be able to finance the project, the procurers assumed that this would imply a 
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rather large firm. In the Bio-fuel case, the size of the supplying firms was not an issue. The 
contracts awarded included on the other hand only construction of the facility, not future 
operations. A specific requirement of size did nevertheless neglect the possibility for an 
ESCO formed by a consortium of smaller firms in the Wood-chip case.  
 
Diffusion of information 
 
Both projects were exposed to the demand to diffuse information of the projects to others. 
Although other factors were more central for the outcomes of these projects, this particular 
requirement still affected the projects in different ways and the analysis of its role also reveals 
some institutional phenomena. In both cases the demand for knowledge diffusion essentially 
came with the EU funding both projects were benefiting from. One difference between the 
cases was how this requirement where perceived among different actors. The stakeholders in 
the Bio-fuel case appear to have complied with this requirement rather well. There was, for 
instance, a website set-up displaying all kinds of information on the project. One of the 
project partners was also assigned to diffuse information about the project to Eastern 
European countries (Bengtsson et al., 2006). Information about the project has also been 
diffused through production and distribution of booklets and through participation in an array 
of events, presentations, workshops etc.  
 
Although one could argue that the Wood-chip case did not reach a point where similar actions 
would make sense, it is still noteworthy that the perception of the knowledge diffusion 
requirement was not particularly sympathetic among some of the stakeholders. There is also 
an institutional explanation for this difference. In the Bio-fuel case, many of the information 
diffusion activities were laid upon the public procurer. In the Wood-chip case, the suppliers 
and future operators of the energy centre were supposed to play a larger role. The suppliers 
did not appreciate this assignment which in turn reflects the difference between political and 
paradigmatic rationalities of public actors and private firms. The suppliers put more emphasis 
on the technical and economic aspects of building and operating the energy-centre and less 
emphasis on the political rationalities associated with knowledge diffusion. This appears also 
to be the case with the suppliers in the Bio-fuel case. As far as this study goes, the suppliers 
did not play an important role in diffusion information about the project. The procurer in the 
Bio-fuel case, acting on behalf of an array of public agencies, was more appreciative to such 
political rationalities. So, although both projects identified the builder/operator as a central 
agent for knowledge diffusion, the difference was that in the Bio-fuel case this concerned a 
public agency, while in the Wood-chip case, a private firm operating under commercial 
rationalities.  
 
Public commitment… 
 
In the Bio-fuel case the procurer essentially performed an intrinsic procurement offering a 
contract to the supplier offering the best solution to the specified problem. This commitment 
meant that the builders of the different parts of the power plant could engage in their 
development work with the expectation to get duly rewarded for their efforts. As was 
described above the procurer also secured an array of commitments from other stakeholders. 
These secondary commitments were important not primarily for the builders of the power-
plant, but for the future operator, i.e. in this case for the procurer itself. Examples of this kind 
of institutional commitment was the clearance from the food industry to use the fertilizers that 
would come out of the system for food production and the acceptance from households to 
adjust their waste handling routines. Thus, one point to make here is that it was the procurer, 
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acting as the future operator that took on the role of establishing these commitments. A 
second point is that they undertook all these arrangements before the tender call was 
published. The project would then be relatively secured from encountering problems 
stemming from the external world. The set-up in the Wood-chip case was different. The 
contractual arrangements required the bidder and future operator to agree to form an Energy 
Service Company, i.e. not only design and bid, but also commercially operate the power plant 
without knowing whether any commitments from other institutional actors could ever be 
achieved.  
 
On the general level were the future/ potential operators in both cases exposed to the same 
challenges the cases differed in terms of the ability for problem owners to deal with them. A 
primary reason for the lack of commitment in the Wood-chip case, as was mentioned above, 
was that some of these institutional actors did not exist at the time for the procurement 
project. One suggestion brought forward was that the local council - a fairly significant future 
tenant in the renewed town centre, could have, if it had wished to make such a commitment - 
worked as a leaver to create the initial market required for the renewable energy centre. The 
position held by the local council was however, based on their interpretation of the 
procurement law. The argument made was that such advance commitment could not be done 
because it might jeopardize the requirement to secure best value for money at all times. The 
other possibility, as was seen in the Bio-fuel case, would be to make the future operator 
facilitate the establishment of such commitments. Given the set-up of the project, this would 
however have required suppliers willing to engage in rather demanding pre-procurement 
activities without knowing whether or not they would eventually win the contract. Thus, even 
if all potential institutional actors had been available and willing to participate, the 
expectations of any such pre-procurement activities appear to be rather unrealistic.  
 
… as Risk management 
 
The importance of taking early measures to deal with risk in public procurement of innovation 
is acknowledged in the literature (Aho et al, 2006; Tsipouri et al., 2010). The notion of early 
supplier involvement underscores the importance of interaction early in the design cycle as a 
way of managing and minimizing risk. “With better exchange of information comes 
knowledge of the situations surrounding the dynamics of a supply relationship, and with that 
knowledge comes greater potential for detecting, averting, and managing supply risk (Zsidisin 
and Smith, 2005, p. 51). What is further interesting is that “potential for product failure is 
minimized by problem prevention rather than through remediation” (Zsidisin and Smith, 
2005, p. 54). Early supplier involvement in the context of public procurement has also been 
discussed (van Valkenburg and Nagelkerke, 2006). The way the project was designed in the 
Bio-fuel case gave the procurers the possibility to take such early measures. Making 
agreements with other institutional stakeholders is also example of preventing problems that 
would potentially emerge once the operations were commenced. The project set-up in the 
Wood-chip case left much of the risk management to the suppliers and future operators of the 
power-plant. This might not in itself be a problem as long as the bidder can add cost 
associated with risk to the price offered. In this case, however, as the revenues were to be 
collected through the future operations, the situation was different than in the Bio-fuel case, 
where the bidders were guaranteed a certain price as agreed with the procurer. The bidders in 
the Wood-chip case were thus left to consider the market risks themselves. Again, any 
ambitions to take early measures such as establishing commitments were also reduced for the 
suppliers partly because of the contract design, but also due to the fact that the future 
customers were not available at the pre-procurement stage.  
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What are the Management implications? 
 
A preliminary attempt to derive some management implications from the cases renders a list 
of observations. It underscores the importance of setting up a project organisation where all 
relevant rationalities are included. It furthermore stresses the importance of interacting with 
and establishing early commitments with stakeholders that might affect the success of the 
future operations, which is also something stressed in the risk management literature. There 
are also lessons to be learned concerning specification and exclusion criteria in tender calls – 
in particular the importance of considering the difference between desired goals and 
requirements. Even if the ambition may be high, it might be sound to design tender calls in 
such a way that less ideal bids are still allowed as a second-best option might still be better 
than no option. However, the cross-case analysis renders another point that concerns the 
procurement processes and the relation to their respective endogenous contexts which 
somewhat reduces the validity of the management implications derived. A contra-factual 
discussion in the following section develops this point further.  
 
Effective and efficient public procurement of innovation 
 
One could ask what had happened if the Wood-chip case had followed a similar approach to 
stakeholder interaction as was applied in the Bio-fuel case. It would be tempting to suggest 
that the procurers in the Bio-fuel case emphasised much more the interaction between 
different stakeholders and became therefore more successful than its British colleagues in 
realising their demand for sustainable energy. To assume that interaction always lead to 
successful outcomes of public procurement of innovation projects is however problematic. 
Such a claim ignores that different institutional levels and rationalities may not be easily 
changed merely by interacting. One side-story in the Bio-fuel case provides a case in point. 
The Bio-fuel case also involved an attempt to build a power plant that was never realised. 
Building the bio-gas facility in Västerås was actually just a solution to a critical problem that 
emerged in the Agroptigas project, namely that Växjö, another Swedish town situated some 
450 kilometres south from Västerås that initially was intended to host the new facility stepped 
down from the project. These developments captured by Bengtsson et al. (2006) are 
summarised in the following.  
 
Around year 2000, Växjö worked together with two neighbour towns, Alvesta and Ljungby to 
develop routines and technology for waste handling and recycling of bio-waste. These towns 
with Växjö as the leading partner got funding to build a facility similar to the one eventually 
built in Västerås. The plan emerging from the agropti-project was to have the bio-waste 
fermentation facility in Växjö and then burn non-biological waste in a facility in Ljungby. 
There emerged however different uncertainties that came to completely alter these initial 
intentions. A common waste-handling method in Sweden at the time was simply to burn the 
waste without separation of bio-waste. This was also the principle followed by the waste-
handling facility operated by the town of Ljungby. Pressure from the EU prompted however 
for removal of fossil-based fuels. Many operators feared that they would be forced to adopt to 
waste handling systems where separation of bio-waste was carried out. After intense lobbying 
from Swedish towns and waste management authorities, Swedish environmental authorities 
eventually interpreted the message from the EU level in such a way that it made it possible for 
Ljungby to commence with operations without separation of bio-waste. To Ljungby would 
sending the bio-waste to Växjö instead of burning it at their own facility also mean a 
reduction of half of their revenue. The result of these developments was that Ljungby 
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withdraw from the project. This situation prompted a search process that eventually led to the 
localization of the bio-fuel facility in Västerås. There were also other telltales of the 
problematic situation that led to the change of localisation of the facility. There prevailed 
local political disagreement about the project. There were also doubts concerning the 
economic viability. The support from local farmers was also at least initially ambivalent. 
Being an area with large forests and the fact that the Ljungby facility were already relying on 
wood-chip as one of the fuels used for operations are further indicators of the institutional 
mismatch between the project and the endogenous institutional set-up. The Ljungby situation 
was rather different than in the Bio-fuel case where farmers for many years had worked with 
the idea of finding alternatives to food production. Another difference between the two 
Swedish cases pinpointed by Bengtsson et al. (2006) concerned the fundamental rationalities 
behind the projects. The work in Västerås was much more driven by a belief in the necessity 
for adjusting to sustainable technologies while decision making among the southern Swedish 
colleagues were mostly affected by economical rationalities.  
 
The issues that emerged in Ljungby are to some extent similar to the situation in the Wood-
chip case. In both cases doubts prevailed concerning the economic viability. Both cases also 
suffered from a lack of stakeholder alignment. It could be argued that both the Ljungby case 
and the Wood-chip case were initiated by exogenous rationalities that did not fully match 
with the respective endogenous institutional setup prevailing in the context in which the 
intended innovations were to be introduced. For Ljungby exogenouity came with the Agropti 
project and the emphasis on bio-fuel which contrasted against economic endogenous 
rationalities and their tradition as a forest region. The exogenous starting point for the Wood-
chip case was private landowners’ initiatives to defeat town centre decline as well as 
exogenous pressure for sustainable technology. In the sense that end-consumers were not 
identifiable an essential part of the endogenous set-up where missing at time of the tender 
process. The supply-market for wood-chip appears also to have been rather underdeveloped in 
comparison to the Bio-fuel case, where ley-crop producers where part of the procurer side. 
The Ljungby case and the Wood-chip cases are therefore interesting as they help to qualify 
the understanding of the virtues of the different measures and steps taken by the procurers in 
the Bio-fuel case. Even if the whole spectrum of measures to interact and establish 
commitments from stakeholders that was taken in the Bio-fuel case, had been set in motion in 
the Wood-chip case, this might not have changed the final outcome anyway.  
 
This gives reasons to re-evaluate the importance of the interaction. For local farmers in the 
Bio-fuel case growing ley crop to be used for bio-fuel production would make out an 
alternative source of income. The realisation of the bio-fuel plant was in that sense the 
manifestation of ideas discussed under many years before the actual procurement project was 
initiated. From that perspective was the formal tender call more the crowning of an 
endogenous process undergoing for many years than the origin of the demand itself. This also 
casts new light on the interaction that underwent between endogenous stakeholders in the 
project. If seen as a project manifesting endogenously evolved demand, the institutional 
change required among actors to achieve an institutional match may have been relatively 
small. The interaction the procurers facilitated in the context of the tender process changed 
perhaps not so much the fundamental rationalities already prevailing among actors as it made 
already endogenous institutions exogenous through formal agreements. It is in that sense 
possible to talk about efficient versus effective public procurement of innovation, i.e. the 
difference between doing the right things and doing things right.  One could argue that among 
the success factors the procurers in the Bio-fuel case could enjoy was also the fact that they 
were doing the right thing in relation to the endogenous institutional set-up. One reason for 
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the problems in the Wood-chip case was that the project attempted to do the wrong thing in 
relation to the endogenous institutional set-up.  
 
Public procurement of innovation as knowledge conversion 
 
The typical contribution of institutional theory in relation to interaction is the focus set on the 
role of institutions as regulator or facilitator of the interaction. When it comes to the outcome 
of the interaction expressed in terms of institutional changes among the actors interacting, the 
implications are however problematic. An institutional analysis of the outcomes of interaction 
has sometimes the tendency to downplay the role of agency and imply a deterministic view of 
change (c.f. Beckert, 1999; Coriat and Weinstein, 2002; Nelson and Nelson, 2002). The same 
tendency has also become embedded in the idealised thinking of public procurement as a 
demand-side tool, emphasizing purchasing power, as a means to make suppliers respond and 
change towards certain exogenously specified behaviours. This paper gives reason to 
challenge such dogmatic understanding. The distinction between endogenous and exogenous 
institutions provides a case in point. The dichotomy implies that an exogenous change 
imposed on an endogenous institutional set-up is for the endogenous institutional set-up a 
matter of adjusting to the exogenous change to avoid remedies, but as far as possible leaving 
the long-term endogenous institutional set-up unchanged. One could argue that the 
implication for such institutional understanding of interaction reduces the expectations of 
what interaction can achieve. The point would be that interaction attained to render innovation 
can only be successful if there prevails already an institutional match between the endogenous 
and the exogenous institutions involved. In other words, no matter what interaction tools and 
techniques that are applied claims about the virtues of certain interactions in a given case 
should only be done with caution, as successes could be explained by the prevalence of 
institutional match rather than any attributes prescribed to the interaction. Similarly, reasons 
for failure might not necessarily be found in the interaction attempted, but in the institutional 
mismatch among interacting agents. An attempt to set up a power plant running on ley-crop in 
region with a large forest industry might be such an example. 
 
Neither of the cases discussed here can be explained well by an analysis based on the 
understanding of public procurement of innovation as something that happens when a public 
agency places a bid for something which does not exist. Such snap-shot perspective may lead 
to an analysis that fails to take into account important developments evolving before the 
formal tender process is initiated. This is bad, as some of these processes might be important 
pre-cursors for the context in which the formal procedure is initiated. The Bio-fuel case gives 
a nice example. Taking account the events that evolved before the formal procurement 
process, it was a project spanning over 15 years. Local farmers had nurtured the basic idea of 
growing fuel instead of food a decade before the actual tender call was published. The formal 
procurement process became just an exogenous extension of the knowledge conversion that 
was already in motion. In the Wood-chip case on the other hand, there was a mismatch 
between certain endogenous institutions and exogenous ambitions included in the tender call.  
 
Applying the Nonaka model in the analysis, drawing on an institutional framework, paves the 
way for an understanding of public procurement of innovation cases as those discussed in this 
paper as ideas evolving in endogenous contexts eventually to, at some point, become the 
target of formal procurement processes. In that light becomes public procurement of 
innovation a way of facilitating endogenous knowledge conversion. This perspective 
fundamentally alters how formal procurement processes should be understood. Rather than 
being an outcome of ‘demand” formal procurement process becomes instead an interface 
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between different institutional entities. Examples of such in the cases discussed here are the 
farmers in the Bio-fuel case, or the landowners and the NGO’s promoting sustainable energy 
in the Wood-chip case. The fundamental implication that crystallises from this perspective is 
clear. The challenge for policy makers interested in promoting public procurement of 
innovation is to establish an institutional match between endogenous possibilities and 
exogenous specifications. Thinking of public procurement of innovation as demand or 
“command” for innovation might render the risk that important underlying mechanisms are 
ignored, which in turn reduces the chances of successful implementation of these policies. 
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